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COMMENTARY
LEGAL EDUCATION'S FUTURE: A BROADER
HORIZON OR A NARROWING WINDOW?
CHARLES D. KELSO*
R. RANDALL KELSO**
INTRODUCTION
Professor Charles McManis suggests that by studying the history of
American legal education-and American political life in general-we
can better understand the processes that change institutions such as
American law schools. We can thus better understand their present
and predict their future.
Professor McManis' basic thesis is that a dialectic process has been at
work on two models of legal education, the "broad" and the "narrow."'
He tells us that forces which led law schools to abandon the broad view
at the end of the first century of American legal education (approxi-
mately 1875) and which favored the narrow view during its second cen-
tury (1875-1975) now foretell a return to the broad view.
The two curricular perspectives can be summarized briefly:
NARROW VIEW BROAD VIEW;
LIMITED TO: THE NARROW PLUS:
Subject Matter Case Law and Judicial Pro- Legislative and Administra-
(What is Taught) cess tive Law and Process; study of
extra-legal materials
Method Case method predominates; Policy-oriented perspective;
(How Taught) practice perspective; case applied skills training; empiri-
skills training cal and humanistic study of
law, impact of law on society
Objectives Develop private practitioners Public practitioners of law;
(To What End) and (particularly those who will public officials and adminis-
Structure represent private interests trators; non-professionals
(By Whom and To Whom) before judicial tribunals)
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. A.B., 1946, J.D.,
1950, University of Chicago; LL.M., 1962, Columbia University; LL.D., 1966, John Marshall Law
School; J.S.D., 1968, Columbia University.
** Associate in Law, Columbia University. B.A., 1976, University of Chicago; J.D., 1979,
University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. McManis, The History of.American Legal Education: A Revisionist Perspective, 59 WASH.
U.L.Q. 597 (1981). Not surprisingly, Professor McManis associates the "broad" view with more
positive consequences.
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Professor McManis' history of American legal education is revision-
ist and, therefore, contentious. It is customary to locate the beginnings
of American legal education in Litchfield and other proprietary law
schools of the late 1700s that taught a narrow common-law curriculum.
Professor McManis rejects this view. Instead, he finds the beginnings
of modem American legal education in the first university professors of
law, such as George Wythe at William and Mary. Beginning in 1779,
the programs in which Wythe and other professors participated did not
separate professional training in law from general academic education
in politics and philosophy. Wythe, for example, lectured on politics
and philosophy and also conducted moot court and moot legislative
exercises. Practical law was thus combined with practical politics to
provide training in citizenship and public service. Thomas Jefferson
created such a professorship at the University of Virginia. Largely be-
cause of the influence of Jefferson and his Republicanism, a number of
such programs spread throughout the South.
After the Civil War, political and educational forces combined to
mold education to a narrower view-a view frequently associated with
Dean Langdell, inventor of the case method in 1873. During this pe-
riod of legislative inaction, the judiciary shaped legal education by
court opinions and by scholarly writings that brought coherence to the
common law. One result, says Professor McManis, was that "[a]s law-
making power increasingly became concentrated in the judiciary, train-
ing for public service increasingly became synonymous with training in
private law for those preparing to practice before the courts."2
Concurrently, the universities, faced with declining enrollments, en-
gaged in a tactical retreat by acceding to demands for practical train-
ing. A university that sheltered a professionally oriented law school
could more easily continue academic training in its other departments.
In the future, says Professor McManis, the broad view may return.3
The thesis of this Commentary, contra to the McManis article, is
that:
(1) The curriculum and perspective of law schools today are broader
2. Id. at 643.
3. A less revisionist, albeit more summary, account of legal education in England and
America before the twentieth century can be found in Stein, The Path of Legal Education From
Edward I to Langdell: .4 History on Insular Reaction, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 429 (1981). See also
Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV.
695, 762-90.
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than they have ever been, especially for students who elect to seek a
broad legal education.
(2) Even broader legal education is not likely because factors both
within and outside the universities point toward a narrowing of law
school programs.
(3) There is at best an uneven case on the merits for further broadening
of legal education.
I. TODAY'S CURRICULUM: A SMORGASBORD OF
BROAD AND NARRow
At the outset, it is necessary to define what is included within the
phrase "law school curriculum." Professor McManis seems to include
within his definition any classes that may be given as part of a continu-
ing legal education program, including an undergraduate course relat-
ing to law or an adult evening education program. To McManis, such
instruction seems relevant in determining whether a legal curriculum is
broad or narrow. We will postpone consideration of those aspects of
"legal education" because the main focus of law schools is the training
of students who seek a J.D. degree.
It is clear that in J.D. programs today the breadth of curricular
choices available to students in most schools, whether measured in
terms of subjects, methods, or both, is at an all-time high. Law schools
are on a plateau at the end of a fifteen-year period of unparalleled ex-
pansion. Between 1965 and 1975 the post-war baby boom reached the
law schools and nearly doubled enrollment.4 The average size of a law
school student body increased from 439 students to 713. During the
same ten years, the average size of a law school faculty rose from
fifteen to twenty-two full-time teachers, and the total number of full-
time faculty members increased from 1,975 to 3,525.1 Thus, the law
4. The American Bar Association's Review of Legal Education in the United States, Fall
1979, provides the following data at page 63:
YEAR TOTAL LAW SCHOOL ENROLLMENT
1950 53,025
1955 40,347
1960 43,695
1965 65,057
1970 86,028
1975 122,542
1979 126,915
5. See Kelso & Kelso, Must Bar Exams Distort Legal Education?, JUDGES' J., Spring 1977,
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schools had an array of new teaching resources to allocate much as they
pleased throughout the curriculum.
Most of the new teachers were assigned to bar examination subjects
or to courses related to bar examination subjects.6 In these courses the
standard teaching perspective is narrow, or is broad only because the
subject includes statutes and regulations or because, in some subject-
areas, one-half of the lawyers involved in the cases are likely to be em-
ployed by the government. Many new teachers, however, were re-
cruited into clinical programs.7 These programs are broad-gauged
because they teach applied skills, demonstrate the impact of law, and
force the students to confront live problems of professional responsibil-
ity. Likewise, courses focusing on applied skills, such as negotiation,
counseling, and interviewing, were added to the curriculum of many
law schools.8 A number of new courses also were created in bur-
geoning legal areas governed largely by statutes and regulations.9 In
many of these new areas the law was undergoing such rapid develop-
at 16, 18. The data are available in the yearly American Bar Association Review of Legal Educa-
tion in the United States.
6. Kelso & Kelso, supra note 5, at 18. Fields in which the number of full-time teachers
increased more than 150% between 1965 and 1975 were as follows (with the total number of full-
time teachers for 1975 enclosed in parentheses):
BAR EXAM COURSES
Criminal Procedure (443); Property (527); Federal Taxation (636); Torts (502); Com-
mercial Law (272).
BAR RELATED COURSES
Securities Regulation (188); Corporate Finance (228); Land Use (202); Anti-Trust
(296); Legal Profession (297).
SPECIALTIES
International Organizations (50).
PRACTICE SKILLS
Arbitration (60); Clinical Teaching (489); Trial and Appeal Practice (432).
NEW FIELDS AND HORIZONS
Credit Transactions (202); Environmental Law (195); Civil Rights (101); Regulated
Industries (100); Law and Poverty (86); Women and the Law (82); Law and Psychiatry
(71); Consumer Law (64); Juvenile Law (62); Water Law (45); Law and Science (96);
Law and Society (96); Law and Medicine (161); and Military Law (28).
Id. at 19. For a critical appraisal of the bar exam in general, see Kelso, In the Shadow of the Bar
Examiner, Can True Lawyering Be Taught?, LEARNING & L., Winter 1976, at 38.
7. See Gee & Jackson, supra note 3, at 881-82.
8. Id. at 877-81. See also Galinson, Interviewing, Negotiating, and Counseling, 27 J. LEGAL
ED. 352 (1976).
9. See note 5 supra (New Fields and Horizons subheading). These courses, in general, were
in response to increased legislative activity during the New Deal and Great Society
administrations.
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ment that attention naturally focused on factors underlying its develop-
ment and on what the law should become.
It is also possible to inject a broad perspective into traditional first
year courses originally built around judicial decisions. Torts or Prop-
erty could be used as the background for an empirical investigation
into whether judicial decisionmaking or some alternative dispute
processing system is a more effective way to resolve disputes. Contracts
could be a testing ground for "broad-based" questioning of the prem-
ises of private commercial law. Most teachers, however, are likely in a
course such as Contracts to concentrate on judicial reasoning and on
relationships between judge-made law, the Restatements, and statutes
such as the Uniform Commercial Code. The values at stake are likely
to be seen as an interplay of familiar homilies such as expectation inter-
ests, reliance, and restitution. The possibility for broader treatment
nevertheless remains.' 0
Never before in American legal education have so many facets of the
law and its practice been the subject of law school courses. Because at
least most of the curriculum is elective after the first year, students to-
day have the opportunity in courses, seminars, and clinics to develop
skills for private or public practice in litigation or office work. Fewer
courses can be found in which policy science is central. Even so, the
curriculum usually will include a course or two in jurisprudence, eco-
nomics and the law, social legislation, etc. In most schools only a few
non-clinical courses are built around an empirical study of the impact
of law on society (other than the impact mirrored in judicial decisions
or an occasional footnote in a coursebook). However, a student who
looks can usually find three or more courses in the catalog that involve
empirical research. Also, opportunities exist for individually guided
research.
The demand for such courses is admittedly not substantial, perhaps
because law students do not view that work as central to what they
need for entering the profession or for success in its practice. It may
also be true that first year courses tend to persuade students that such
work is not in the mainstream. Whether the law schools should do
more to whet student appetite for a broader curriculum is, of course, a
debatable question. We consider that question in Section III of this
10. A full-context perspective of Contracts problems is embodied in new teaching materials
being prepared by a group of teachers at the University of Wisconsin School of Law that includes
Professor Stewart Macaulay.
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Commentary. We turn now to the question of whether a broader per-
spective seems likely to emerge.
II. WHY THE FUTURE PORTENDS A NARROWER VIEW
A. Factors Traditionally Recognized as Influencing the Curriculum
Whether the range of subjects included in law school curricula be-
comes broader or narrower and whether the curriculum will be taught
from a broader or narrower perspective depend upon forces both
within and without the law schools. Many of those forces are quite
familiar.
1. Internal Forces
The single most powerful internal force is the budget. How much
money will be made available to the law schools from donors, state
legislatures, and university budget processes determines what the law
schools can hope to do. Most law school budgets depend substantially
on tuition income. If enrollment falls, tuition income will decrease.
For the years ahead, most observers predict a decline in student enroll-
ment. External sources of money are not likely to replace the loss of
tuition income. The Council on Legal Education for Professional Re-
sponsibility (CLEPR) is no longer funding clinical programs. No other
private foundation has taken up that slack, and in the near future Con-
gress is not likely to support law school building programs or legal
service activities within the law schools. Congress is providing less
grant money to the states, and state legislators will be looking for places
to cut their own state budgets.
It thus seems likely for the decade of the '80s that at least some of the
law schools and their universities will face the question of whether the
existing number of instructors can be maintained. Some cuts may be
handled merely by eliminating one section of a course currently offered
twice in the same semester or academic year. Some courses may come
to be offered every other year. A few cuts may go even deeper and
require that the curriculum be trimmed. Expensive clinical programs
and seminars on newly developed fields will be tempting places to be-
gin. They probably will have less powerful support in faculty councils
than will the more traditionally established courses that relate to the
[Vol. 59:661
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bar exam and that draw heavy student enrollment."I
There was a time in the late 1960s when some students clamored for
courses that they considered relevant to current social problems. They
wanted to re-examine the foundations of the legal system, consider al-
ternatives, and explore implications for a new style of life. A number
of those concerns were embodied into law by Congress and state legis-
latures, and they have been absorbed into courses on the environment,
on poverty, on women and the law, and the like. The pressure for con-
tinued change in that direction has now slackened. Students seem far
more concerned with getting a foothold in the profession as it now ex-
ists and preparing themselves in a traditional fashion. 12 Bar-related
courses draw the largest enrollment.
Other internal forces press against any substantial change, broad or
narrow. First, the law schools have grown large, and inertia is the
strongest force in any large institution. Second, the strongest economic
motivation for scholarship in legal education is coursebook royalties,
and a large publishing system is entrenched. It is not easy to bring
about substantial changes in the format or content of law school teach-
ing materials. Dramatic experiments are few and far between.
2. External Forces
The American Bar Association's program of accreditation is admin-
istered by the Council of the ABA's Section of Legal Education and
Admission to the Bar. The Council attempts to ensure by its visitation
program and by gathering annual statistics that law school libraries are
adequate to user needs, that the faculty-student ratio is appropriate to
the program, and that a reasonable portion of law school tuition in-
come is used for law school purposes and not diverted to other uses.
II. The preference of law students for bar related courses is thoroughly documented in D.
JACKSON & E. GEE, BREAD AND BUTTER?: ELECTIVES IN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1975).
12. The high number of law graduates in recent years and thus the possibility of an increas-
ingly vigorous scramble for employment after graduation may be, in part, a cause of this changing
attitude. Professor Roger Cramton recently noted:
The number of law graduates in recent years has affected the psychology of both law
students and practicing lawyers. The scramble for employment has significantly influ-
enced the hidden curriculum of law schools--that amalgam of attitudes, values, activi-
ties, and experiences that may not be part of the formal curriculum but is a significant
part of the total educational experience. Law students, in their preoccupation with se-
curing employment, select courses that they believe to be preferred by employers, partici-
pate in law practice during law school, and spend an enormous amount of time and
psychic energy on job hunting.
Cramton, Change and Continuity in Legal Education, 79 MICH. L. REV. 460, 462 (1981).
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The Council does not, however, intrude very deeply into the curricu-
lum. ABA curriculum requirements call for offering instruction in sub-
jects generally regarded as the core of the law school curriculum,
offering training in professional skills, and requiring for all students at
least one rigorous writing experience and some training in professional
responsibility. 13 Beyond this they do not go. Thus, schools are free to
present a broad or a narrow perspective, as they wish. The member-
ship requirements of the Association of American Law Schools do not
explicitly require any different kind of program, though they do call for
a commitment to research.' 4 Students, however, tend to select elective
courses that have immediate relevance for the bar exam. To the extent
that bar exams stress narrow subject matter and narrow skills, the bar
may provide indirect pressure for a narrow legal education.
In recent years the judiciary has sought to influence legal education
in a single direction that falls within McManis' broad category. 5 Some
judges and several court-appointed committees have called for more
training in practical skills, particularly trial advocacy.' 6 Several state
supreme courts have made instruction in certain traditional subjects a
prerequisite for taking the bar exam or for admission to practice.' 7 An
ABA committee formulated guidelines for clinical legal education that,
in general, endorsed what the courts have been saying about compe-
tence and skills training but sought to put skills training in a broader
context.'" As noted, there has been a substantial increase in clinical
courses and practical skills instruction. Some of this may have been
due to judicial pressure. More of it was due to the encouragement of
the CLEPR, which made grants to law schools to aid in the establish-
ment of clinical programs. CLEPR is no longer making its grants,
13. See ABA STANDARDS AND RULES FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard
302(a) (1979).
14. Faculty members have an important responsibility to advance as well as to transmit or-
dered knowledge. A member school has an obligation to assist its faculty to discharge this respon-
sibility. Bylaws of the Association of Ameican Law Schools, Inc. 6-8(c) (1980).
15. See Kelso, supra note 6, at 38; Kelso & Kelso, supra note 5, at 17.
16. Burger, Advocacy on Trial, LEARNING & L., Spring 1974, at 26; Pedrick and Frank, A
Clare and Present Danger, LEARNING & L., Winter 1976, at 46; The Open Door Policy on Trial- 4
Symposium, LEARNING & L., Winter 1975, at 46. See also Gee & Jackson, supra note 3, at 909-10.
17. Boshkoff, Indiana's Rule 13: The Kily-Loo Bird othe Legal World, LEARNING & L.,
Summer 1976, at 18; Givan, Indiana Rule 13: It Doesn't Invite Conformity. It Compels Compe-
tency, LEARNING & L., Summer 1976, at 16. See also Gee & Jackson, supra note 3, at 905-08.
18. AALS/ABA COMMITTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL EDUCATION, GUIDELINES FOR
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION (1980).
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however, and what was once a crescendo of judicial concern seems to
have abated. There now seems to be enough clinical and trial practice
instruction to satisfy most of the judicial concern.
The bottom line for the immediate future is that curriculum deci-
sions will probably be more influenced by internal factors-which press
for narrowing of the curriculum-than by external factors. Decisions to
eliminate all clinical programs or all practical instruction would com-
mand the attention of the ABA and of the judiciary. Trimming and
adjustment are not likely to get much attention.
B. The Influence of Political Forces
McManis asserts that yet another external force affects the breadth or
narrowness of legal education: political forces in the society. He con-
cludes that this force points toward a broadening of American legal
education. This original contribution deserves discussion.
McManis' basic insight is to associate judicial supremacy with nar-
rowly focused legal education. This leads us to ask whether legislative
supremacy, on the other hand, should be associated with broadly fo-
cused legal education. During the first period of legislative supremacy
in this country's history-the Jeffersonian era and Jacksonian democ-
racy-broadly based law professionships vigorously competed with the
narrower proprietary schools. Broad training for citizenship and public
service was considered a particularly worthwhile form of education.
During the era of judicial supremacy that followed the Civil War,
however, the narrow view of legal education won out. During this era,
McManis notes, judges both "dominated the faculties of a number of
academic law schools" and constituted "their chief rivals, both in their
doctrinal writing. . . and in their own private law schools. If, after all,
the law is what judges say it is, what better place to learn the law than
from the person who purported to discover it ." 9 McManis
concludes:
[T]he decline of the broad view of academic legal education after the mid-
point of the nineteenth century was attributed not so much to the triumph
of the Harvard model of legal education as to the triumph of the
judiciary.2"
McManis' analysis appears to presuppose a dichotomy between two
19. McManis, supra note 1, at 643.
20. Id.
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kinds of societies: common law societies and civil law societies. This
dichotomy seems correct at the general level at which it is offered. One
can nonetheless question whether the analysis correctly foretells a
return to the broad model of legal education. Our hunch is that the
political forces existing and gathering in society today tend to reinforce
all of the other external and internal forces that press toward the nar-
row version of legal education. Clarification of the dichotomy may
help evaluate its use for prediction.
In his discussion McManis alludes to a number of differences be-
tween common law and civil law systems that can be reformulated in
the following way.2 1 In common-law systems, the judiciary is central to
much of legal decisionmaking. Because the common law grows from
fact analysis applied to individual cases, it tends to emphasize individ-
ual rights fixed in rules and principles. The decisionmaking thus in-
volves more narrowly focused analysis than the broad-based
policymaking that is typical of legislatures.22 The overriding concern
of a common law system is likely to be the protection of individual
personal and property rights against majoritarian tyranny.23 Thus,
common law systems are typically associated with capitalism. The
roots of the common law are in England, with the early American
counterpart being the Federalism of Alexander Hamilton.24 When the
system oversteps its bounds, it is likely to be because the judiciary has
too greatly emphasized individual rights to the exclusion of legislative
enactments. Lochner v. New York 25 stands as the best American
example.
Civil law societies, on the other hand, start from the premise of un-
questioned legislative supremacy. Legislation, not appellate opinions,
is the main legal source. Legislatures balance social policies. Thus,
arguments made before a legislature are more likely to be concerned
21. Id. at 638-39. The dichotomy between common law and civil law societies that follows in
this article is based on McManis' discussion but goes somewhat beyond it in systematizing a dis-
tinction between common law and civil law systems about which McManis only hints.
22. The distinction drawn here is rooted in the distinction drawn by Ronald Dworkin be-
tween rules and principles, about which courts are primarily concerned, and policies, about which
legislatures are primarily concerned. See R. DWORIuN, TAKING RIGHTS SERiOUsLY 81-130
(1977). The distinction is summarized neatly in Richards, Taking Rights Seriously: Reflections on
Dworkin and the 4merican Revival of Natural Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1265, 1306-13 (1977).
23. See, e.g., J. LocKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett 1960).
24. See Hurst, Alexander Hamilton, Law Maker, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 483 (1978).
25. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state maximum work week law declared unconstitutional for inter-
fering with the freedom of master and employee to contract with each other).
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with general welfare than with individual rights.2 6 As the individual
rights emphasis of the common law is compatible with capitalism, the
general welfare focus of the civil law tends toward socialism. The civil
law system's modem-day roots are in France and the Napoleonic Code.
The American revolutionary counterpart to the civil law system is the
Republicanism of Thomas Jefferson. When the civil law system over-
steps its bounds, it is likely to be in the direction of denigrating individ-
ual rights by placing too great an emphasis on the collective. The fact
that all Marxist societies have developed within civil law countries and
adopted civil law systems is the legacy of the civil law system's errors.27
Judicial review, given the premise of legislative supremacy, is likely to
be limited to a representation reinforcing model, a la John Hart Ely.
28
As regards legal education, the corollary is between common law
systems and narrow legal education, and civil law systems and broad
legal education. When the judiciary exercises broad decisionmaking
power, when the relevant standards for decision are rules and princi-
ples involving individual rights (particularly property rights), and when
the system tends toward representing private interests, legal education
will tend to be focused on the narrow skill of representing private inter-
ests before courts. Instruction will be on how to read judicial opinions
and how to argue cases to a court. Under a civil law system, it is more
important to have the broader ability to understand the legislative and
administrative processes, argue policy to a legislative committee, and
26. See generally R. DwoRgiN, supra note 22, at 83.
27. See J. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW: A SEARCH FOR THE COMMON CORE OF
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE MARXIAN SOCIALIST STATES (1969). A related problem with civil
law systems is their tendency to be manipulated by demagogues who claim to represent the will of
the masses. Napoleon's statement, "The Revolution is Me," is reflected in civil law personality
cults from the Fascist right to the Marxist left. (That society is supposed to have, in Rousseau's
phrase, one "common will" may account for the plausibility of the demagogue's claim.)
In the United States, one can also see the results of an errant civil-law process at work. In our
political history, we have had only one politician who combined collectivist learnings with the
Napoleonic attitude and the demagogery one associates with a civil-law system gone awry. That
person was Huey Long. It is merely a coincidence that he came from and was able to hold sway
over our only civil-law state, Louisiana?
28. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). An additional correlation between common-
law and civil-law societies can be suggested. Because civil-law systems start with general rational
principles of social welfare, arguments within such a system are more likely to be phrased in terms
of grand systems of over-arching rationalized ideology. It is the French, Germans, and Russians,
all from civil-law countries, that one associates with ideological tracts. Common-law analysis, on
the other hand, starts from the facts given in an individual case. Thus the emphasis is more likely
to be on solving the particular problem first. The pragmatic philosophies of William James and
John Dewey are consistent with this type of analysis.
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base arguments upon the general welfare of the society instead of indi-
vidual rights. Public solutions bargained out in the legislative arena,
rather than private solutions structured by the common law of the
courts, will be more the focus of a lawyer's training. To the extent that
a legal system tends toward socialism, education for such a society
tends to be broader as there is a greater need in socialistic societies for
public practitioners concerned with planning public policy.
The above dichotomy helps reveal certain tendencies in the Ameri-
can political scene over the past fifty years that, consistent with
McManis' analysis, might support a broadening of American legal edu-
cation. The triumph of Roosevelt's New Deal reaffirmed the legisla-
ture as the central balancer of public policy decisions in our society.
The program of the Great Society stressed public solutions and legisla-
tive answers to societal problems. Although the judicial activism of the
Warren Court led to acquiescence in an activist judiciary by many con-
stitutional law scholars (perhaps because of agreement with that
Court's substantive decisions), the emergence of the Burger Court in
the 1970s has renewed calls for limits on judicial review. Congressional
supremacist positions, combined with judicial restraint, have become
the fashion.2 9 The ideal of process-based rights, limiting the Court to
ensuring better access to the political process, has been in vogue.3
Further, codification efforts have gained force at the state levels, as
state legislatures, now meeting frequently, have begun to reassert deci-
sionmaking authority that previously had been left up to "the only on-
going political institutions in the state capitals,"' 3 1 that is, the courts.
These events, increasing legislative power at the expense of the courts,
should lead to a broadening of legal education if McManis is correct
about the interplay of such political processes and legal education.
Some evidence for this exists. The infusion of lawyers into public
policy positions in the government at the time of the New Deal led to
29. Concern over the appropriate limits on judicial review and emphasis on congressional
supremacy runs from persons on the conservative end of the political spectrum, see Friendly, The
Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. RE. 21 (1978); Rehnquist,
The Adversary Society, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1978), to persons on the liberal end, see Tushnet,
Constitutional and Statutory Analysis in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1301
(1978); Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125. The results of
the arguments, of course, depend upon the author's political persuasion.
30. See J. ELY, supra note 28. See also J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
31. McManis, supra note 1, at 642, quoting Stevens, Two Cheersfor 1870. The American Law
School, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 424 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971).
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calls for a public policy focus in legal education.32 Increased legislative
activity spawned courses in legislation. Increased administrative activ-
ity led to courses in administrative law. The Great Society legislation
is reflected in courses such as civil rights, environmental protection,
poverty law, and employment discrimination. 33
Further, the rapid increase in the number of law schools and in law
school enrollment in the last fifteen years has brought into legal educa-
tion a number of young law professors who, having received their col-
lege and legal education during the '60s and early '70s, are more to the
left in the political spectrum than are their older colleagues. These
young professors tend to conduct a more policy-oriented class.
One should not, however, overestimate the power of these forces at
work. Courses in legislation, administrative law, and public interest
law, for example, have tended to focus on the substantive side of the
law and not on the process through which the laws are passed, adminis-
tered, and enforced. The perspective has not been to study reformist
Great Society statutes as attempts by the government to legitimate its
authority.34 Nor has the focus been on showing how these statutes, os-
tensibly passed to ameliorate the harsh effects of capitalism, inevitably
turn out, at the level of implementation, to be less burdensome on cor-
porate interests than they seem to be on their faces .3 Rather, the focus
has been on the practical narrow legal skill of how to argue the Great
Society statutes both ways before a court-the narrow case method
skill of legal analysis perfected at Harvard by Ames.36
Further, to the extent that political forces have an effect, the present
political climate does not suggest any support for a broadening of the
law school curriculum. Indeed, the political forces appear to be mov-
ing in the opposite direction. The controlling powers in Washington
today are not committed to public or government solutions to
problems. They seek private sector answers. The Great Society pro-
grams are being rolled back, if not eliminated. In the short-run future,
32. See, e.g., Lasswell & McDougall, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Train-
ing in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
33. See note 6, supra.
34. See, e.g., Offe, Political Authority and Class Structures-tn Analysis of Late Capitalistic
Societies, 2 INT'L J. Soc. 73 (1972).
35. Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 115 (1979).
36. Ames is generally credited for making the case method work as an instructional tool. See
Holmes, Educationfor Competent Lawyering-Case Methodin a Functional Context, 76 COLUM. L.
REv. 535, 557 (1976).
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lawyers will not be asked to aid in creating new programs, a task that
would call for a "broader" legal education. Rather, they will be asked
only to aid in administration of the present law, a "narrower" task.
Additionally, if Congress itself becomes increasingly conservative,
the cry for congressional supremacy to offset Burger Court conserva-
tism will become increasingly counterproductive from the liberal per-
spective. If the legislature should be "hegomonic" over the court, this
suggests that the legislature should be able constitutionally to control
the Supreme Court's docket, removing jurisdiction to hear cases deal-
ing with abortion, prayer in school, busing, and the other issues on the
conservative agenda. The response to a conservative Congress may be
a return of individual rights theories that stress the judiciary's role in
protecting against the majoritarian bias of legislative enactments. In-
fatuation with the process-based theories appears to be on the wane.
The rather strong message from a recent Ohio State University Law
Journal Symposium on books by Professors Ely and Choper (which
advocate representation reinforcing models of judicial review) is that
the time for process-based theories has come and gone.37 To the extent
that this has any effect on legal education generally, it would be to re-
emphasize individual rights, judicial power, and appellate decision-
making; in short, the narrow perspective on legal education.
Of course, it is possible that the present political tendency in the
United States may turn around. The liberal scenario for this future is
based on the premise that if the Reagan economic program creates eco-
nomic havoc, social pressure might once again be generated for in-
creased government involvement in attempting to solve social
problems.38 In such a case, public opinion might turn away from the
Reagan administration's English, capitalist, individual rights model
(with its emphasis on the private sector, small government, and prop-
erty rights) and turn toward the French civil law model (focusing, as it
does, on government solutions, group welfare arguments, and the so-
cialism of Mitterrand). More government would create a need for
more public practitioners to ensure effective management of a once-
again expanding public sector. This might increase the pressure for
broad-based legal education, in ways suggested above, and, perhaps,
lead to government funding of broad-based programs. Such funding
37. See Symposium: Judicial Review Versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1-434 (1981).
38. John Kenneth Galbraith predicts such a failure of the Reagan economic program in Up
From Monetarism and Other Wishful Thinking, N.Y. Rav. BooKs, August 13, 1981, at 27, 30-32.
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probably is needed if such programs are to increase in number; a possi-
bility severely limited under the present administration.
The die-hard leftist, of course, would see a different picture. Adopt-
ing the fiscal crisis model of James O'Connor,3 9 the leftist would argue
that capitalism itself creates a structural fiscal crisis evidenced by pres-
ent levels of inflation and unemployment. That crisis cannot be solved
under the capitalist model. According to this analysis, we are in the
period of late capitalism--soon to be replaced by socialism.4" Reagan-
omics is the last, or next to last, gasp of capitalism before its eventual
demise. To the contrary, however, the overzealousness of leftist predic-
tions on the demise of capitalism is well known. Further, it is probably
more true that loose monetary policy and deficit spending by Congress
over the past twenty years has created inflationary pressures and that
they will be eased by better monetary control, decreased government
spending, and a freeing up of the private sector.
In short, unless capitalism is structurally doomed as leftists predict,
or unless Reagan's economic program fails, it is unlikely that political
forces will be arrayed to push for or even aid a broadening of law
school instruction. McManis may hope or predict that either the liberal
or the leftist scenarios suggested above may happen. Our reading of
the historical evidence suggests, however, that national conservatism,
A la Reagan, may be here to stay for quite a while. Broadening the
law school curriculum will find little support from those conservative
political forces.
Admittedly, institutional factors within the law school are likely to
play a greater role than politics for any change in legal education in the
near future. Some internal pressure may be generated for a broader
curriculum, because the law faculty now exerts more control over cur-
ricular choices than in the past and there has been an infusion of young
professors with somewhat more activist liberal leanings who would
support a "broadening" of legal education. Financial pressures and
student desires, however, are likely to be more decisive factors in an era
of declining enrollment and financial difficulties. These factors point to
a narrowing of legal education.
Scholarship on legal education may, of course, play a role in deter-
39. J. O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973).
40. Id. at 1-10, 221-56.
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mining the future. We include a consideration of that factor as we con-
sider what the future of legal education should be.
III. THE UNEVEN CASE FOR BROADENING LEGAL EDUCATION
A. The Issues Raised by McManis
Schools should continually face the question of whether to change
what they are doing--even though inertia is hard to overcome and
change in large institutions is difficult to implement. McManis' distinc-
tion between narrow and broad perspectives in legal education raises
these questions for the future:
(1) Should judicial law and process be de-emphasized and greater atten-
tion given to legislative and administrative law and process?
(2) Should more instructional time be devoted to applied skills rather
than to analytic abilities?
(3) Should law schools concentrate on training students to represent pri-
vate clients, or should legal education become more directly relevant
to future public practitioners, public officials, and nonprofessionals
whose careers relate to law?
(4) Should there be a more policy-oriented perspective in law school cir-
riculum-whether, for example, the law schools should give more
attention to what the law ought to be and how it is actually working
in society?
1. Legislative and Administrative Materials
During the 1960s and 1970s, the law grew more rapidly by enactment
and promulgation than by judicial decision. As we have noted, those
legal changes are reflected in new courses on civil rights, employment
discrimination, poverty law, and the like. These new developments
have not fully been absorbed into coursebooks for traditional core ar-
eas. That should happen, and it will happen. The formulation of legis-
lative policy should be an explicit subject of discussion in at least one
first year class, just as following the development of judicial doctrine
through a set of related cases is typically dealt with in at least one first
year course.41 The skills of analysis, long a focus of the narrow curricu-
lum, should be broadened in this way.
41. Compare H. JONES, J. KERNOCHAN & A. MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD: CASES AND TEXT
MATERiAs 37-219 (1980) ("Case Law: The Analysis and Synthesis of Judicial Decisions") with
id. at 255-593 ("The Interpretation of Statutes") andid at 594-736 ("Coordination of Judge-Made
and Statute Law").
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2. Applied Skills v. Analysis
For some time, law students have complained that the traditional
second and third years of law school tend to duplicate the first, except
with different subjects.4" In clinical courses and simulations, however,
law students are faced with a wider variety of factors and with situa-
tions that more accurately reflect the problems lawyers face. As a re-
sult, students tend to acquire a more complex set of sophisticated skills.
This is a desirable broadening of legal education, particularly as it pro-
vides opportunities for probing certain issues of professional
responsibility.
Our representational system creates a tension that each lawyer must
face in terms of balancing personal and representational roles. What
the client wants and what the lawyer would like to do are sometimes in
conflict. In a representational system, this tension never goes away-
although it can be ameliorated by choosing a professional setting in
which a majority of client desires are similar to what the lawyer prefers.
Until recently, law schools have not explicitly addressed this tension.
Awareness of the problem, and a sense that it ought to be discussed in
law school, seems to be on the upswing, particularly in clinical pro-
grams and in professional responsibility courses. Some professional re-
sponsibility courses may still deal only with the disciplinary provisions
of the present Code. Others, however, take the opportunity to discuss
how lawyers do and should balance personal choices and their repre-
sentational roles.43 Clinical programs potentially provide an even bet-
ter avenue for discussion of the problem. A student experiences the
tensions and conflicts of professional practice directly when represent-
ing clients in the clinic. Discussion has a felt relevance and immediacy
not present when problems are raised in a classroom.44
In addition, clinical programs generally create a broader perspective
with respect to all applied legal skills. 5 Pressures from the bar for
42. See, e.g., Dunne, The Third-YearBlahs: Felix Frankfurter-After F#ty Years, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 1237 (1981).
43. For a few articles on the subject, see Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional
System, 27 CATH. U.L. REv. 191 (1977); Lehman, The Pursuit ofa Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L.
REv. 1078 (1979); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 Wis. L. REv. 29. See also Kelso & Kelso, Conflict, Emotion andLegalEthics, 10 PAC. L.J. 69
(1979).
44. See, e g., Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instructiox Its Theory and Implementa-
tion, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67, 71-79 (1979).
45. For a useful survey of clinical legal education, citing many of the relevant articles, see
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more skills training courses and student interest in applied skills bode
well for these courses. Whether clinical instruction will remain at its
present level (or will increase) probably will depend in large part on
whether clinical professors generate convincing evidence that they are
teaching important skills that differ from those acquired in less costly
classroom settings. They must be able to show that they are not merely
giving students a foretaste of practice. An ability to make this case may
rest in part on whether carefully recorded observations documenting
the effectiveness of clinical teaching methods can be made and in part
on creating materials and syllabi whose intellectual content can be
judged in conventional ways.46
3. Training for Private Practice or Public Office
Whatever may be its research and service goals, a modem law school
is not likely to survive very long unless its graduates are prepared to
pass the bar exam and enter a certain number of career roles. A typical
array of first jobs for a graduating class is as follows: Private practice,
55%; government, 16%; judicial clerkships, 5%; business, 9%; public
service/public interest, 4%; academic, 5%; military (JAG Corps), 5%;
other, 1%.4 1
It may not be wise to design an educational program around the spe-
cifics of a particular career, such as private practice. The broadness of
present curriculum offerings discussed in Section I shows that law
schools are not presently guilty of that error. Nevertheless, a law
school's curriculum would surely be incomplete if it did not provide
instruction in at least some of the applied skills of private practice: trial
practice, counseling, negotiation, and transaction planning, for exam-
ple. Further, the basic analytical skills used in private practice are in
general the same skills used by a government lawyer who makes or
administers the law. With four years of college a prerequisite for law
school, and many other graduate programs available for persons who
wish to continue their study of political science, philosophy, or eco-
nomics in post-collegiate programs, it would seem reasonable for the
Gee & Jackson, supra note 3, at 881-92. See also Kelso & Kelso, The Future of Legal Educationfor
Practical Skills: Can the Innovations Survive?, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1007, 1015-23.
46. The survival problems of clinical programs that are expensive, that are not immediately
assimilable into the traditional program, or that are inconsistent with the present incentive pro-
grams of the law schools are discussed in detail by Gee & Jackson, supra note 3.
47. 1980-81 MCGEORGE SCHOOL OF LAW CATALOG 23.
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law schools to concentrate on those phases of education that make legal
education distinctive, bringing in extra-legal materials and other career
models only where they contribute to the law school's central mission."8
4. Policy-Oriented Perspectives
A faculty should have members who are prepared to question the
most fundamental of accepted social values or legal premises and sub-
ject them to close intellectual scrutiny. All professors should be ready
to question-at some level of generality--the premises of a subject
under study. Part of a professor's (indeed a lawyer's) job involves con-
cern with whether beneficial changes can be made in the legal system
or in concepts of professional responsibility.49
Broad instruction that addresses issues of what the law ought to be-
questions of public policy-nevertheless raise somewhat different ques-
tions than are raised by instruction in professional responsibility or ap-
plied legal skills. Law professors typically have beliefs about what is
right, what the law ought to be, and how to go about reaching conclu-
sions on such matters. Yet law professors are properly concerned to
avoid propagandizing particular positions on public policy.
This concern does not necessarily mean that law professors should be
neutral at all times during class. Assuming the posture of a neutal ob-
server-even if that can be done-is at least implicitly to take the posi-
tion that a lawyer is above policy disputes. That view is itself
debatable.5 0 Further, impartiality is difficult, if not impossible, to
maintain. Decks should not be secretly stacked. It may be better to
admit one's point of view to a class rather than try to keep it hidden.
A professor who is aware of his or her own value and policy biases
and who alerts the class is probably acting within the tradition of
American academic education. Our tradition has been that a profes-
48. It may be disagreement on this proposition that prompts McManis to disagree with tradi-
tional writers. In McManis' Epilogue, Reed and the Columbia movement are chastized for having
pulled back from unlimited use of general public policy or social science materials and for using
those materials only as they related to the law school's central mission of training lawyers.
McManis would have liked them to go further, apparently even if more effective training of law-
yers would not have been the result.
49. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 8, provides that "A Lawyer Should
Assist in Improving the Legal System." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNSmILrrY, Canon 8.
EC 8-9 provides that, "The advancement of our legal system is of vital importance in maintaining
the rule of law and in facilitating orderly changes; therefore, lawyers should encourage, and
should aid in making, needed changes and improvements." Id, EC 8-9.
50. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
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sor's role is to help students learn the process of thinking and weighing
competing claims so they can better make decisions for themselves.
Students must be able to free themselves from the confines of doctrine
and to exercise an ability to clarify goals, determine trends, make pro-
jections, and consider alternatives.5"
Traditionally, law schools develop that kind of thinking by training
in the methods of careful reasoning, looking for arguments "both
ways," following the implications of conclusions, and the like. They
can also develop that kind of thinking by studying materials that ex-
plicitly raise policy or value conflicts within concrete settings. In the
course of such a discussion, individual viewpoints-even the profes-
sor's-may be discussed. Honest disclosure of value positions differs, of
course, from attempting to bring students around to one point of view
on a particular policy or social perspective.
Discussion of policy conflicts within concrete settings additionally fo-
cuses attention on the empirical consequence of adopting various
courses of action. It thus helps to avert a tendency, inherent in "broad"
policy discussions, to base arguments upon abstract generalizations that
may have little truth or relevance to the particular problem at hand.
Broad policy courses must be something other than the general political
science lectures that one envisions were given as part of the broad cur-
riculum at Virginia or at William and Mary after the American Revo-
lutionary War. Policy courses must show that they are useful adjuncts
to the traditional values taught in law schools-values such as a con-
cern about facts, a wariness about premature or over-generalizations,
and a concern for applied legal skills. Useful discussion about policy at
an abstract level of ideology presupposes an informed understanding of
facts drawn from a multitude of disciplines that most law students, and
law professors, do not have. Discussion by law students and law
professors of these issues is likely to degenerate into general platitudes
devoid of any understood rigorous analytic foundation.
An over emphasis on the need to infuse the legal curriculum with
broad policy discussions involves the risk that it may lead to the pursuit
in individual classes of an unstated ideology that is assumed to be true
to the exclusion of an objective examination of all competing theories.
The McManis article can perhaps be analyzed as an example of this
tendency. The article does not explicitly adopt or refer to Marxist ide-
51. See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 45, at 1021-23.
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ology, yet Marxist catchwords frequently appear. We are told that we
must "unite theory and practice." We are told that historical forces
determine the progression of events. A dialectic exists in which Jeffer-
son's broad view, replaced by Langdell's narrow view, is to be replaced
by a move back to the broad view, with a higher level of understand-
ing. The author's preference is for the Jeffersonian view, which is de-
scribed as "truly revolutionary." We should beware lest the judiciary
becomes "hegemonic" over the legislature. We should be skeptical of a
tendency by the judiciary and private lawyers to act in the interests of
"corporate, mercantile interests." The historical account is
"revisionist."
Further evidence exists in the political dichotomy outlined earlier. It
is clear that McManis falls on the civil law/socialist rather than the
common law/capitalist side of the line. He argues against judicial he-
gemony. He appears to prefer the French civil law system to the Eng-
lish common law. He prefers Jefferson to Hamilton, citing, one
assumes with approval, Jefferson's attack on Blackstone and the Eng-
lish common law tradition. McManis' concern is for more public prac-
titioners, greater public participation in law school education, and
infusing into legal education a concern with politics and the common
good. He is less concerned with improving the training of lawyers for
the private sector. Training public practitioners goes hand in hand with
public, governmental solutions and centralized planning. A general
"broad" legal education for the public at large may be a catchphrase
for an unstated desire to "demystify" the law by "raising the conscious-
ness" of the general public so it will believe in the exploitive nature of
the present, private commercial law and the need for government con-
trol of the economy.
This may be the McManis picture--or it may not. The Marxist per-
spective may be right-although it probably is not. The important
point is that no explicit caveat to the article exists that describes the
ideological tradition out of which McManis' conclusions are drawn.
Thus, one does not know whether to take seriously the Marxist catch-
words: are they red herrings or not? Information on this point would
help in deciding whether this article is just another overly optimistic
reading of why the historical forces mandate that society-here legal
education-will move in a direction that the author wants.
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B. A voiding an "Identity Crisis"
Debate on "broad" and "narrow" legal education is not new. The
issues, when clarified, usually amount to questions of degree in recon-
ciling and accommodating elements that all persons concede have some
place in the process. For example, the first issue of the Journal ofLegal
Education, in 1948, carried essays on law school goals by Lon Fuller
and Karl Llewellyn that addressed many of the issues raised by a
"broad" versus "narrow" debate.52
Fuller argued that although law schools can and should impart
knowledge and lawyer skills while exposing students to great minds,
their most fundamental goal should be to provide students with insight
into the basic processes of adjudication (dispute settling of all kinds)
and legislation (the accommodation of conflict interests and crafting
that accommodation into a plan for the future).53 This is clearly one
aspect of what McManis considers a broad perspective.
In contrast, Karl Llewellyn emphasized another aspect of a broad
curriculum.5 4 He contended that various legal craft skills, such as case
analysis, interpretation, and the arts of argument, drafting, counseling,
and negotiating, should be taught more directly by concentrating on
problem raising situations presented in considerable detail. He thus
anticipated the clinics and simulations developed in the 1970s, just as
Fuller had urged with prescience that the law schools should concen-
trate on classroom discussion of adjudication and legislation.
Fuller and Llewellyn agreed that the first degree program should not
be organized in terms of intense specialization for relatively narrow ar-
eas. Both also called for explicit training in professional responsibil-
ity-thus anticipating by almost twenty-five years the ABA's
requirement. They disagreed, however, on the essence of professional
responsibility." Llewellyn, the advocate for skills training, saw profes-
sional responsibility as the art of making reasonably sound decisions on
policy. Fuller, who advocated concentrating on legal processes, saw
professional responsibility as an ability to explore the relevant factors
involved in accommodating the demands of the lawyer/client relation-
52. Fuller, What the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers, 1 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 189, 189-202 (1948); Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC.
211, 211-18 (1948).
53. Fuller, supra note 52, at 189-202.
54. Llewellyn, supra note 52, at 211-18.
55. Compare Fuller, supra note 52, at 202-04 with Llewellyn, supra note 52, at 219-20.
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ship. Thus each professor emphasized, in discussing professional re-
sponsibility, what he had tended to slight in describing the central goal
of legal education.
How to find a golden mean that best accommodates the overlapping
objectives discussed by Fuller and Llewellyn remains an unresolved
problem. On the one hand, schools are and should be studying basic
social problems to an extent, occasionally with the aid of methods
drawn from other fields. In this way, the law schools are drawn more
deeply into the central intellectual current of university life. On the
other hand, the schools properly are seeking ways of improving skills
training to develop the competence of young lawyers. This brings the
schools into contact with the profession. An uneasy tension exists.
Dean Francis Allen has recently characterized this tension as an "iden-
tity crisis."56 However, Dean Allen does not predict or advocate a vic-
tory by one side over the other. Instead, he says, the law school must
become an even more pluralistic community than it has yet become.57
Achieving a creative and balanced pluralism will be difficult-proba-
bly even more difficult in the 1980s than in the 1970s. Schools now face
the likelihood of a decline in applications, and the size of faculties is
not likely to increase. The schools will work largely through personnel
who are already in place. Financial difficulties will continue, and no
great breakthrough in teaching effectiveness or in administrative effi-
ciency can be expected. No great breakthroughs were achieved in the
1965-75 period of expansion, even though it was then possible to fund
clinical programs and the beginnings of TV and computer technology
were present. It seems even less likely that breakthroughs will occur in
the forthcoming period of stability or retrenchment.
Arguments for the introduction of undergraduate programs, continu-
ing legal education programs, or adult education programs have little
relevance for this general conclusion. CLE programs are typically
targeted for practicing lawyers. The instruction they provide is geared
56. Allen, Humanistic Legal Education, The Quiet Crisis, U. MICH. QUADRANGLE NOTES
Spring 1981, at 25.
57. Id. at 31. Dean Allen says,
Educational policy in the law schools during the closing years of this century is likely to
become increasingly pragmatic, consciously experimental. We shall have to distribute
our eggs among many baskets. This is true because the needs we serve are altering and
we do not yet know very clearly what form they will take and, in any event, the demands
of legal education will become increasingly numerous and diverse. It seems likely, there-
fore, that if the law school is to flourish as part of the university, or even survive, the law
school must become an even more pluralistic community than it has yet become.
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toward the needs of the private attorney. Thus, they tend to address
"narrow" questions. Undergraduate classes may address "broader"
questions. It is difficult, however, to believe that it would make much
difference in what the students actually receive whether their professor
was a political scientist or a law professor doing a political science type
of instruction. What difference it would make in terms of a broad legal
education to have professors teach a few adult night classes is not ex-
plained by McManis.
The question of joint degree candidates is worth a little more atten-
tion. It may be that having a few students involved in a joint degree
program would add to the "chemistry" of a law school class. It seems,
however, that joint degree programs in business or accounting would
have little impact because the additional instruction would be directly
related to skills used in private sector, commercial employment, and
that is "narrow" under McManis' definition. Joint degree candidates in
public administration, public policy, or sociology might create greater
pressure for broader legal education. It is likely, however, that any in-
creased pressure for broader consideration of problems by a few joint
degree candidates would be more than outweighed by internal and ex-
ternal factors that suggest no further broadening and, indeed, some
narrowing of the traditional J.D. degree program.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is tempting to find that historical forces make inevitable what one
would like to see occur. One hopes to discover those historical forces
because describing them may help to bring about the desired objective.
Another tendency is to view life in either-or terms or to find dichoto-
mies rather than unravel a complexity or sense a randomness of bloom-
ing, buzzing confusion. Again, it is nice to find in the past a Shangrila,
a Utopia, and then to discover that in the future there will be a return
to the halcyon days of yore.
To the extent that McManis focuses on legal education of law stu-
dents interested in becoming lawyers, we sense all three temptations at
work in McManis' article. The past was rarely the "good old days,"
however, and fortunately the present is better than nostalgia might
make it seem.
As for the future, we hope that it will contain some of the broad
aspects that McManis predicts. Nevertheless, that breadth will have to
be defended by a more vigorous line of argument than that Thomas
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Jefferson or George Wythe thought it relevant and appropriate for gen-
tlemen in post-revolutionary America. The historical currents that
McManis thinks favor a return to a broader view of legal education are
more likely to be swamped by the financial, institutional, and external
pressures that pull in the opposite direction.
If legal educators have anything to learn from studying their own
history, it is not that a return to broader education is on the horizon,
but rather that first, useful change is infrequent and very difficult to
accomplish, particularly in large institutions, and second, it is hard to
do anything well.
It is tempting to think that there was once a brief, shining moment of
glory and that it can be easily recaptured. The truth, rather, seems to
be that once upon a time George Wythe gave some lectures on law and
political science that today can be found in any good political science
department. Students would not choose to attend a law school today
that offered such a curriculum. The guidelines for legal education are
much better grounded in an analysis of what law students need today
than what colonial gentlemen needed in the late 1700s.
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